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ABSTRACT 
 
Does corporate reputation affect analyst’s decision to cover a firm? This paper uses the data from Europe (Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey) 
to show that analyst coverage is an increasing function of corporate reputation during the period between 2008 and 
2013. Our results are consistent with Gabbioneta et al. (2007) who show that corporate reputation increases the 
emotional appeal of a firm in the eyes of analysts. Furthermore, we also argue that investors are interested in firms 
with better reputation. It is, therefore, possible that investors demand analyst research for more these firms, thereby 
resulting in higher analyst coverage for these firms. Our results are robust in different sub-samples and in different 
estimation procedures. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
orporate reputation is defined as a set of collectively held beliefs about a firm's ability to satisfy the 
interests of its various stakeholders. It is an additional construct that combines cognitive dimensions and 
is based on firm’s characteristics, such as firm’s products and services, its strategy and quality of 
management, and its market position. Lee and Roh (2012) argue that corporate reputation differentiates a firm from 
others and attracts customers, suppliers, employees, and investors. Most of prior literature presents evidence on how 
corporate reputation helps firms to accrue benefits from different groups of stakeholders (Boyd et al., 2010; Bergh et 
al., 2010; Roberts and Dowling, 2002). Cornell and Shapiro (1987), for instance, show that quality of firm’s 
reputation increases its ability to engage in cheaper implicit contracts. They note that various claims issued by firms 
take the form of tacit promises of continuing supply, timely delivery, product enhancement, and job security. These 
claims are relatively cheaper to implement than explicit contracts and firms with high reputation are better 
positioned to take benefit of these claims. In another related study, Boyd et al. (2010) show that employees desire to 
work for firms with good reputations. As a result, reputable firms are able to recruit and retain a competent work 
force with less contracting and monitoring costs. This strand of literature argues that reputation serves as a signal to 
outside stakeholders that firm’s offers (such as its products and services, employment conditions, or investment 
opportunities) are of high quality. A reputable firm, therefore, enjoys favorable premiums in various economic 
transactions relative to other firms. Favorable premiums enjoyed by reputable firms, eventually, translate into 
superior financial performance of these firms. Antunovich and Laster (1998) document that portfolio of the most 
reputable firms generate a one-year abnormal return of 3.20% and a three-year abnormal return of 8.30%. They also 
show that portfolio of the least reputable firms earn a negative abnormal return of 8.60%. In another related study, 
Clayman (1987) finds that the reputable firms outperform S&P500 by 1.10% a year. Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue 
that greater interest from investors translates into lower capital costs, thereby positively affecting the performance of 
firms with high reputation. 
 
An important group of stakeholders that has received relatively lesser attention in prior literature on corporate 
reputation is financial analysts. Financial analysts are agents that gather, interpret and disseminate information about 
firms to investors. This paper argues that financial analysts are attracted towards firms with high reputation for a 
number of reasons.  
 
C 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2016 Volume 32, Number 5 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1302 The Clute Institute 
• First, analyst’s decision to cover a certain firm is a function of the demand generated by investors for 
analyst’s research. We argue that firms having good reputation among investors are more likely to 
generate greater demand for analyst’s research. Investors, being interested in these firms, would like to 
demand more information about these firms. Analysts are likely to respond to this increased demand of 
information by increasing their coverage.  
• Second, corporate reputation may increase emotional appeal of a firm in the eyes of analysts. 
Gabbioneta et al. (2007) document that corporate reputation displays a high correlation with the overall 
disposition of financial analysts towards a firm. They show that firms with better reputation are 
preferred by analysts. Greater emotional appeal associated with reputable firms, therefore, leads to 
increase in analyst coverage. 
• Third, we believe that analysts have incentive to cover those firms that are more likely to generate 
trading from investors. Analyst’s compensation is, partly, a function of the trading that he generates via 
his research. We argue that it is easier for analysts to generate trading for firms that already enjoy good 
reputation among investors. Therefore, it is likely that analysts will cover firms that have good 
reputation.  
 
Consistent with above arguments, this paper shows that the extent of analyst coverage is an increasing function of 
corporate reputation in Europe (Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, 
Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey) during the period between 2008 and 2013. We show significantly 
positive relationship between the extent of analyst coverage and corporate reputation during our sample period. Our 
arguments are consistent with Gabbioneta et al. (2007) who show that corporate reputation displays a high 
correlation with the overall disposition of financial analysts towards a firm. Reputation enhances the emotional 
appeal of a firm in the eyes of analysts and induces them to cover these firms. Our results have implications for 
firms in a way that it highlights the channel via which firms can attract more analysts. Given that analyst coverage 
can enhance firm value (Farooq and Satt, 2014), any channel that can help improve analyst coverage is important. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the data. Section 3 presents assessment of 
our arguments and Section 4 document robustness of our analysis. The paper ends with Section 5 where we present 
conclusions. 
 
2. DATA 
 
This paper documents the impact of corporate reputation on the extent of analyst coverage in Europe during the 
period between 2008 and 2013. For the purpose of this paper, our sample comprise of firms listed in Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey. 
All data is in Euros. Following sub-sections explain the data in more details. 
 
2.1 Corporate Reputation 
 
Reputation is defined as a consensus impression about how a firm will behave in any given situation (Bromley, 
2002; Sandberg, 2002). It is based on a set of collectively held beliefs about a firm’s ability and willingness to 
satisfy the interests of various stakeholders (Fombrun, 1996). This paper uses the data from Datastream to develop 
an index of corporate reputation (CR). Datastream provides the binary data for the following items related to various 
dimensions of corporate reputation: The first item (CR1) indicates whether the company has a policy to avoid 
bribery and corruption. The second item (CR2) indicates whether the company has a policy towards business ethics. 
The third item (CR3) shows whether the company has a policy to be a fair competitor. The fourth item (CR4) shows 
whether the company has a policy to increase the indirect economic impact on local communities. The fifth item 
(CR5) indicates whether the company has a policy to treat its suppliers and contractors as key business partners. The 
last item (CR6) indicates whether the company monitors its reputation with communities? The above items capture 
various aspects of a firm’s structure, policies and practices that constitute good corporate reputation. Each item is 
constructed in a way such that presence of that item adds one point to the reputation score. Thus, the rating is on a 
scale of zero to six, with a higher score indicating better corporate reputation. A total corporate reputation score for 
each firm is calculated each year. Table 1 documents descriptive statistics for corporate reputation index (CR). Our 
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results in Table 1 show that Italy and Spain have significantly higher corporate reputation score than other countries. 
We also show that Poland has the least corporate reputation score. Table 1 also shows that firms headquartered in 
Western Europe have relatively higher emphasis on corporate reputation than firms headquartered in other countries. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for corporate reputation 
 Countries Mean Median Standard Deviation No. of Observations 
E
m
er
gi
ng
 
E
ur
op
e 
Czech Republic 2.3970 2.0000 0.7753 68 
Greece 1.4960 1.0000 1.8434 252 
Poland 1.1004 0.0000 1.5677 219 
Russia 2.0113 2.0000 1.8236 176 
Turkey 1.9508 2.0000 1.4498 183 
N
or
th
 
E
ur
op
e Denmark 1.8026 2.0000 1.7129 375 
Finland 2.8699 3.0000 1.4610 469 
Norway 2.7546 3.0000 1.3640 481 
Sweden 2.8972 3.0000 1.3776 886 
W
es
t 
E
ur
op
e France 2.8616 3.0000 1.8464 1424 
Germany 2.7574 3.0000 1.8180 1080 
Italy 3.5220 4.0000 1.8318 795 
Spain 3.4537 4.0000 1.7446 725 
 
2.2 Analyst Coverage 
 
We define analyst coverage (ANALYST) by the maximum number of analysts issuing annual earnings forecasts in a 
given year. Greater the number of analysts covering a firm, the better is its information environment. Data for 
analyst coverage is obtained from I/B/E/S. Table 2 documents the descriptive statistics for analyst coverage during 
our sample period. We include only those firms in our analysis for which we have the data for corporate reputation. 
Our results show that firms headquartered in Western Europe have higher analyst coverage, followed by firms 
headquartered in Northern Europe and Emerging Europe.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for analyst coverage 
 Countries Mean Median Standard Deviation No. of Observations 
E
m
er
gi
ng
 
E
ur
op
e 
Czech Republic 15.8939 17.0000 6.5542 66 
Greece 13.5990 13.0000 6.6521 217 
Poland 13.5518 12.0000 5.4548 212 
Russia 6.1603 4.0000 5.1402 106 
Turkey 19.2705 19.0000 4.9336 170 
N
or
th
 
E
ur
op
e Denmark 15.5614 14.0000 8.7105 301 
Finland 19.9855 18.0000 11.1528 346 
Norway 20.5879 19.0000 7.6668 432 
Sweden 18.0049 17.0000 8.5631 806 
W
es
t 
E
ur
op
e France 21.1170 21.0000 8.7122 1333 
Germany 25.7272 27.0000 9.5565 957 
Italy 17.6349 16.0000 10.5656 693 
Spain 23.8636 24.0000 9.1371 660 
 
2.3 Control Variables 
 
We use log of total assets (SIZE), total debt to total asset ratio (LEVERAGE), dividend payout ratio (PoR), and 
growth in total assets (GROWTH) as control variables. The data for control variables is taken from the Worldscope. 
We argue that these variables define the information environment of a firm to varying degrees. For instance, larger 
firms are more complex and therefore have higher information asymmetries (Vermaelen, 1981; Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991). Firms with high leverage and growth are more risky and therefore require more careful 
evaluation (Smith and Watts, 1992; McLaughlin et al., 1998). Firms with higher payout ratios or earnings are more 
likely to have better information environments (Jegadeesh, et al., 2004; LaPorta et al., 2000). Prior literature 
considers information environment as a significant determinant of analyst coverage. However, the sign of this 
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relationship – positive versus negative – is inconclusive. On one extreme is a literature that considers negative 
impact of information environment on analyst coverage. For example, Lang et al. (2004) find that analysts are less 
likely to follow firms with high information asymmetries. While on the other extreme is the literature that 
documents the opposite. Lang and Lundholm (1996), for example, find that analyst coverage is positively correlated 
with disclosure quality. 
 
Table 3 documents descriptive statistics for control variable. An interesting observation in Panel A is relatively low 
payout ratios by European firms during our sample period. Given that our sample period is the post-crisis period, we 
expect firms to be relatively conservative in their payout ratios. Furthermore, Panel B shows no severe 
multicillinearity problems between control variables. As a result, we can include all of these variables in regression 
equations. 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics for analyst coverage 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics statistics  
Variables Mean Median Standard Deviation No. of Observations 
SIZE 17.0068 17.0097 1.9670 6999 
LEVERAGE 27.4496 26.5600 16.5593 6937 
PoR 36.5348 36.4200 27.3605 6002 
EPS 6.0173 1.4800 24.3549 6247 
GROWTH 9.8249 0.0000 72.9220 5263 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
Variables SIZE LEVERAGE PoR EPS GROWTH 
SIZE 1.0000     
LEVERAGE 0.0827 1.0000    
PoR -0.0519 -0.0203 1.0000   
EPS 0.2162 -0.0943 -0.0568 1.0000  
GROWTH -0.0213 -0.0490 -0.0590 -0.0162 1.0000 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to document the impact of corporate reputation on analyst coverage, we estimate the following regressions 
with the extent of analyst coverage (ANALYST) as a dependent variable and corporate reputation index (CR) as 
independent variable. All variables are defined as above. We use panel regression with fixed effects to estimate the 
following regressions. Hausman test is used to decide between the presence of fixed effects or random effects. 
 
( ) εCRβαANALYST 1 ++=  (1) 
 
( ) ( ) εSIZEβCRβαANALYST 21 +++=  (2) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) εGROWTHβEPSβPoRβLEVβSIZEβCRβαANALYST 654321 +++++++=  (3) 
 
Table 4 documents the results of our analysis. Our results show that higher corporate reputation score leads to higher 
analyst coverage. We document significantly positive coefficient of CR for all equations. Consistent with above 
arguments, we argue that firms having good reputation among investors are more likely to generate greater demand 
for analyst’s research. Investors, being interested in these firms, would like to demand more information about these 
firms. Analysts are likely to respond to this increased demand of information by increasing their coverage.  
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Table 4. Effect of corporate reputation on analyst coverage 
Variables Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) 
CR 0.3101*** 0.2680*** 0.2862*** 
SIZE  3.0379*** 2.4983*** 
LEVERAGE   -0.0600*** 
PoR   0.0155*** 
EPS   -0.0098* 
GROWTH   -0.0018*** 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 7133 6999 4189 
No. of Groups 1304 1280 1092 
F-Value 117.09*** 117.36*** 63.12*** 
NOTE: Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% significance by **, and coefficients with 10% significance 
by *. 
 
4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
4.1 Effect of Corporate Reputation on Analyst Coverage in Different Sub-Samples Based on Size 
 
As a first robustness check, we divide our sample into sub-groups of small, medium, and large firms. We re-estimate 
Equation (3) for all sub-groups. Our results are reported in Table 5. Our results show that higher corporate 
reputation leads to greater analyst coverage in sub-groups of small and medium firms. We report significantly 
positive coefficient for CR for these sub-groups. Interestingly, our results also show that there is no impact of 
corporate reputation on analyst coverage for large firms. We report insignificant coefficient for CR for large firms. 
We argue that larger firms have more resources to manage their reputation. Therefore, it is possible that all large 
firms have put in place better policies to manage their reputation. As a result, there may not be enough variation in 
CR within large firms, thereby resulting in insignificant relationship between corporate reputation and analyst 
coverage. 
 
Table 5. Effect of corporate reputation on analyst coverage in different sub-samples based on size 
Variables Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms 
CR 0.3820*** 0.3534*** -0.0086 
SIZE 3.0946*** 1.5199*** 3.9321*** 
LEVERAGE -0.0618*** -0.0597*** -0.0709** 
PoR 0.0186*** -0.0063 0.0389*** 
EPS -0.0322 -0.0193 -0.0084 
GROWTH -0.0032** -0.0006 -0.0027** 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 1393 1359 1437 
No. of Groups 398 407 380 
F-Value 16.61*** 32.00*** 38.94*** 
NOTE: Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% significance by **, and coefficients with 10% significance 
by *. 
 
4.2 Effect of Corporate Reputation on Analyst Coverage in Different Sub-Samples Based on Regions 
 
As a second robustness check, we divide our sample into three sub-groups. First sub-group comprises of firms 
headquartered in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain (West Europe), second sub-group consists of firms 
headquartered in Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (North Europe), and third sub-group consists of firms in 
Russia, Turkey, Greece, Poland, and Czech Republic (Emerging Europe). We re-estimate Equation (3) for all sub-
groups. Our results are reported in Table 6. We show that corporate reputation is a significant determinant of analyst 
coverage in West Europe and in North Europe. We report significantly positive coefficient of CR for these sub-
groups. In case of Emerging Europe, we report no impact of corporate reputation on analyst coverage. We report 
insignificant coefficient of CR for Emerging Europe. This result is interesting because it indicates that analysts do 
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not cover firms with high reputation in these markets – probably because demand for analyst coverage may be high 
for firms with lower reputation. 
 
Table 6. Effect of corporate reputation on analyst coverage in different sub-samples based on regions 
Variables West Europe North Europe Emerging Europe 
CR 0.3681*** 0.2710** -0.0445 
SIZE 3.3282*** 0.9140* 1.6438* 
LEVERAGE -0.0823*** -0.0921*** 0.0239 
PoR 0.0057 0.0129 0.0470*** 
EPS -0.1840*** 0.0193* -0.0083* 
GROWTH -0.0034*** 0.0005 -0.0034* 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 2480 1202 507 
No. of Groups 632 306 154 
F-Value 42.33*** 19.69*** 13.55*** 
NOTE: Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% significance by **, and coefficients with 10% significance 
by *. 
 
4.3 Effect of Corporate Reputation on Analyst Coverage at Different Quantiles 
 
Our analysis implies that no matter what point on the conditional distribution is analyzed, the estimate of the 
relationship between corporate reputation and analyst coverage is the same. To test the empirical validity of this 
restrictive assumption and to document the relationship at different points of conditional distribution of analyst 
coverage, a quantile regression is applied at five quantiles (namely 0.10, 0.30, 0.50, 0.70, and 0.90). The results of 
our analysis are reported in Table 7. As was shown above, our results indicate that positive impact of corporate 
reputation on analyst coverage at all quantiles. We report significantly positive coefficient of CR for all quantiles.  
 
Table 7. Effect of corporate reputation on analyst coverage at different quantiles 
Variables 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 
CR 0.8334*** 1.5591*** 1.4068*** 1.5272*** 1.3107*** 
SIZE -0.9170*** 1.3577*** 1.9600*** 2.2098*** 2.0527*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0023 -0.0255** -0.0254* -0.0429*** -0.0639*** 
PoR 0.0235*** 0.0533*** 0.0616*** 0.0532*** 0.0511*** 
EPS -0.0076 -0.0861*** -0.0763*** -0.0490** -0.0471*** 
GROWTH -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0041* -0.0062*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 4189 4189 4189 4189 4189 
Pseudo R-Square 0.0610 0.0852 0.1536 0.2097 0.2586 
NOTE: Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% significance by **, and coefficients with 10% significance 
by *. 
 
4.4 Effect of Different Dimensions of Corporate Reputation on Analyst Coverage 
 
There may be concerns that not all aspects of corporate reputation are important for analyst coverage. In order to 
address this concern, we re-estimate Equation (3) by replacing CR with the individual components of corporate 
reputation index. The results of our analysis are reported in Table 8. Our results show that CR2 (whether the 
company has a policy towards business ethics), CR3 (whether the company has a policy to be a fair competitor) and 
CR4 (whether the company has a policy to increase the indirect economic impact on local communities) do not 
affect the extent of analyst coverage. We report insignificant coefficients for these variables. The remaining three 
components of corporate reputation index (CR1, CR5, and CR6) are significantly related with analyst coverage. 
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Table 8. Effect of different dimensions of corporate reputation on analyst coverage 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
CR1 0.5572*      
CR2  0.1400     
CR3   0.4763    
CR4    0.3096   
CR5     0.5266*  
CR6      0.7830*** 
SIZE 2.4370*** 2.4973*** 2.5222*** 2.5325*** 2.4957*** 2.5878*** 
LEVERAGE -0.0597*** -0.0607*** -0.0616*** -0.0610*** -0.0609*** -0.0637*** 
PoR 0.0158*** 0.0158*** 0.0155*** 0.0157*** 0.0156*** 0.0156*** 
EPS -0.0097* -0.0095* -0.0097* -0.0092* -0.0095* -0.0096* 
GROWTH -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0019*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
No. of Observations 4189 4189 4189 4189 4189 4189 
No. of Groups 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 
F-Value 62.86*** 62.07*** 62.55*** 61.93*** 61.60*** 63.17 
NOTE: Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% significance by **, and coefficients with 10% significance 
by *. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper uses the data from Europe to document the relationship between corporate reputation and analyst 
coverage during the period between 2008 and 2013. Our results show that firms with higher reputation are followed 
by more analysts. Our results are consistent with Gabbioneta et al. (2007) who document that corporate reputation 
displays a high correlation with the overall disposition of financial analysts towards a firm. We argue that preference 
of analysts for firms with high corporate reputation may also be driven by the fact that these firms enjoy good 
reputation among investors. As a result, it is possible that investors demand analyst serices for these firms more than 
other firms. We also show that our results are robust for different estimation procedures. 
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